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CaseNo.20070489-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Brandon Kyle Rowley,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(2)(a)(i), - 4 (a) (i) (West Supp. 2007).! This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does an official search of a truck, after private parties entered the truck,
found incriminating items, and revealed the presence of those items to law

Section 58-37-8, but not the cited subsections, has subsequently been
amended. Utah Legislative Service Ch. 295, §1 (West 2008).
2

Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2 (West 2004), has been renumbered, as
cited. Utah Legislative Service Ch. 3, § 350 (West 2008).

enforcement, violate defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's "underlying factual
findings are reviewed for clear error." State v.Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11,100 P.3d
1222. Its legal conclusions, including its application of the law to the facts, "are
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103
P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a
class A misdemeanor. R7. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. R50-43.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R78-77, 86-83; Defendant
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. R95-94,102-96,104-03. The
court sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year prison term, but stayed the prison
term pending the resolution of the appeal. R109-08. Defendant timely appealed.
R i l l . Defendant moved for a certificate of probable cause, which the court granted.
R106,110.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Testimony of Dudley Rowley (defendant's father)
On May 24,2006, defendant's mother called defendant's parole officer to pick
her son up. R27:5. As defendant left, he asked his parents to take care of some
things that were in the bed of his Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck. Id. at 5-7. Mr.

3

The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. R27:3-20. The State
"recite [s] the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the
suppression hearing." State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, t 1 n.l, 173 P.3d 213
(citation omitted).
3

Rowley then pulled defendant's pickup into the garage, to protect the items in the
truck bed from the weather. Id. at 4-5. Id. at 7. While in the cab, Mr. Rowley saw in
a little "open cubby hole" beneath the dashboard a syringe with some kind of
substance in it and a small porcelain cup containing some kind of substance. Id. at
5-6. He showed the syringe to his wife, who then opened defendant's bags, which
were in the bed of the pickup. Id. at 6. In one of them, she found a digital scale. Id.
Mr. Rowley called the police to turn the items over to them. Id.
Defendant later called from the jail. Id. at 18. Mr. Rowley confronted
defendant with their discovery of the drugs he had found in the truck. Id. Mr.
Rowley did not recall defendant's exact conversation, but defendant did not deny
that he owned the drugs. Id. at 19.
The Rowleys had loaned defendant a thousand dollars to buy the truck,
although defendant had never registered it, nor titled it in any name. Id. at 6.
Nevertheless, Mr. Rowley considered that the truck belonged to defendant. Id. at 7.
Mr. Rowley had never driven the truck before this incident. Id. at 18.
Defendant did not ask his father to get into the truck and move it. Id.
However, the only way Mr. Rowley could accede to his son's request was to drive it
into the garage, because he was unable to carry the items. Id. Mr. Rowley did not

4

recall that the truck was locked. Id. Following instructions from the police, he
placed the items he had found back in the truck where he had found them. Id. at 8.
Testimony of Story Provstgaard
Deputy Sheriff Story Provstgaard had some history with the Rowley family:
he had previously investigated a report from Mr. Rowley that defendant might have
stolen some of Mr. Rowley's checks. R27.8-9. Id. at 9. When the Rowley's
discovered the drugs in defendant's pickup, they had a telephone conversation with
him while he was in jail and confronted him with their discovery. Id. at 9 Deputy
Provstgaard monitored that conversation. Id. at 9-10. Mr. Rowley later called
Deputy Provstgaard to inquire about what he should do with the drugs. Id. at 10.
Deputy Provstgaard advised him to leave them where he had found them. Id.
Deputy Provstgaard drove to the Rowley home. Id. In defendant's truck, he found
the syringe and a small cup; the substance in the cup field tested positively for
methamphetamine. Id. at 9,12. The result was confirmed by the crime lab. Id.
Deputy Provsvtgaard did not ask for defendant's permission to search
because defendant was in custody at that time. Id. at 11. He did not impound the
truck. Id. at 12. The Rowley's house is located in a drug-free zone—1000 feet from
Rock Canyon Park. Id. at 13.

5

Testimony of Brandon Rowley
Defendant testified that the truck belonged to him, that he had owned it for
five to six months, and that it was titled in his name. R27:15. When he asked his
father to take care of the things in the bed of the pickup, the truck was locked. Id.
He did not give anyone, including his father, permission to move his truck, nor did
he give his father the keys. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his suppression
motion tinder both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. He argues that the court misapplied
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, that defendant's parents
lacked either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, and that the
situation did not present exigent circumstances justifying the search. The Court
need not consider these arguments because defendant has not also challenged the
independent and separate basis on which the court denied the motion. Here,
defendant has not challenged the court's conclusion that the search did not violate
his rights under the federal and state constitutions because his expectation of
privacy in the truck was extinguished when his parents entered it, found the
incriminating drug-tainted paraphernalia, and then revealed their discovery to the
6

police. That result has been approved by this Court, following the United States
Supreme Court. It is also fully supported by the trial court's findings, which
defendant does not dispute. Failure to attack a trial court's ruling waives the issue
on appeal and establishes the court's ruling as law of the case, precluding further
consideration. In the same vein, the Court need not consider defendant's actual and
apparent authority arguments because the court did not even rule that the search of
the truck was justified by any form of consent.
In any event, defendant's plain view and exigent circumstances arguments
are without merit. Defendant concedes that there was probable cause to search his
truck because the deputy observed the drug-tainted paraphernalia from a place he
was lawfully entitled to be.

He argues only that there were no exigent

circumstances justifying entry into the truck. Under the Fourth Amendment,
however, there is no separate exigency requirement under the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement. And this Court has recently recognized that the
automobile exception is no longer premised on a vehicle's mobility. Thus, no
exigent circumstances were necessary to justify the deputy's entry into defendant's
truck, even though defendant's parents has secured it inside their garage.
Defendant's rights were also not violated under article I, section 14. First, case
law demands that, as a threshold matter, defendant have an expectation of privacy
7

in the area searched. Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the cab of
his truck after his parents intruded and made their discoveries known to the police.
Therefore, the issue of exigent circumstances does not even arise.
In any case, Utah case law asserting that probable cause and exigent
circumstances are required to justify a search under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement is in doubt. That requirement is based only on two plurality
decisions—Stofe v. Larocco, 794 R2d 460 (Utah 1990) and State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1996). The Anderson plurality agreed with the Larocco plurality in large
part because case law from the United States Supreme Court also required that the
warrantless search of a car be supported by exigent circumstances. Since Anderson,
however, the Supreme Court has announced that exigent circumstances are no
longer required to justify a search under the automobile exception. Thus, the
authority of current Utah law requiring that a warrantless search be supported
exigent circumstances is now suspect.
Finally, because Utah's interpretation of article I, section 14 should generally
follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court should readily conclude that the automobile exception in Utah also entails
no separate exigency.

8

ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS TRUCK DID NOT VIOLATE
EITHER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION OR ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the
warrantless search of his truck was justified under the federal and state
constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 8-17. He argues that the trial court misapplied the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement, that defendant's parents lacked either
actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, and that the situation did not
present exigent circumstances justifying the search. Id. This Court should reject
these arguments because they are variously unresponsive to the legal basis of the
trial court's ruling denying the suppression motion and are, in any case, without
merit.
A. Proceedings below.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence, alleging that it had been improperly
discovered by his parents and the police in the cab of his truck in the absence of his
parents' actual or apparent authority to consent to a search or exigent
circumstances. R50-43.
The State argued two theories in response. First, the deputy's discovery of
drug-tainted paraphernalia did not implicate the search and seizure provision of
9

either the federal or state constitutions because it followed a private search by
defendant's parents. R66-64. Second, the illegal items were discovered by the
deputy in plain view, and, thus, were not subject to the warrant requirement. R64.
The trial court denied the motion. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order ("Findings and Conclusions/7 R86-83, at 83) (Addendum A). The court
found that, while moving defendant's truck into his garage, Mr. Rowley discovered
a syringe and a small porcelain cup containing a crystalline substance in "an open
cubby hole in the truck's dash." R85. After Mrs. Rowley found a digital scale in a
bag in the rear bed of the truck, the Rowleys called the police. Id. Deputy
Provstgaard told the Rowleys to put the items back where they had found them and
that he would come to their house to retrieve them. Id. When the deputy arrived,
Mr. Rowley accompanied him to the garage. Id. Deputy Provstgaard could see the
syringe and the cup from outside the truck. Id.. He opened the door of the truck
and seized the syringe and the cup with the crystalline substance and the digital
scale from the bed of the truck. Id. at 85-84.
The court also made these factual findings: (1) the Rowleys "acted as private
citizens and were at no time acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriff's office or
any other law enforcement agency"; (2) the Rowleys "gave voluntary consent for
Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard to enter their garage, where defendant's truck was
10

parked"; and (3) "[t]he syringe and small porcelain cup with the crystalline
substance were located in the plain view of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard from a place
he was entitled to be." R85.
The court made the following conclusions of law:
1. The syringe, the small porcelain cup with crystalline
substance and the digital scales discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as
private citizens, does not fall within the scope of the prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article One, Section
Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution.
2. The presence of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard in Mr. and Mrs.
Rowleys garage was occasioned by voluntary consent and thus is
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State
Constitution.
3. The "plain view" discovery of the syringe and small porcelain
cup with crystalline substance that was taken into custody by Deputy
Provstgaard falls under the recognized exceptions to the requirement
of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State
Constitution.
4. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the
Utah State Constitution.
R84-83.

11

B. The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion.
1. Because defendant has not challenged the primary basis for
the trial court's ruling, this Court should summarily affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's suppression motion.
The Court should summarily affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
suppression motion because defendant on appeal has not challenged a separate and
sufficient basis for the court's ruling.
It is well established that an appellant's, failure to challenge a trial court's
ruling on appeal establishes the court's ruling as the law of the case, precluding
further judicial review of the matter. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228,1229 (Utah
App. 1992) (citing Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp^ 619 P.2d 340, 341 (Utah App.
1980) ("Where . . . any other final ruling or order of the trial court, goes
unchallenged by appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter
subject to later challenge."). See also State v. Ellis, 356 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,9-10 (Utah
App. 1998) (appellate court bound by earlier decision under law of the case
doctrine). See also State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,124 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to
address a state constitutional challenge to a search where defendant had failed had
failed to brief or argue state constitutional guarantees at either the pretrial hearing
or on appeal);."); Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 2454 21,988 P.2d 1 ("Appellant,

12

by failing to raise, brief, or argue the issue on appeal, waived any challenge to trial
court's additional [ basis for] ruling on summary judgment

")

In the proceedings below, the State's principal argument, independently
justifying the warrantless entry into defendant's truck, was that Deputy
Provstgaard's discovery of the drug-tainted paraphernalia stemmed from a private
search, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. R66-64 (citing State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219,1220-21 (Utah 1988)) (additional citations omitted). Defendant did not
reply to this argument. In denying defendant's suppression motion, the trial court
specifically found that the Rowleys "acted as private citizens and were at no time
acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriff's office or any other law enforcement
agency." R85. The court evidently agreed with the State's primary reason for
denying defendant's suppression motion: the illegal items "discovered by Mr. and
Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does [sic] not fall within the scope of the
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article One, Section Fourteen of
Defendant nowhere challenges this basis for the denial of his motion.
Accordingly, this Court should summarily affirm the trial court's ruling denying his

13

suppression motion.4 Sterger, 808 P.2d at 124; State v. Emmet, 839 P.2d 781,786 (Utah
1992) (refusing to reach remaining issues where another resolves appeal, unless
remaining issues may arise on retrial). In any case, the court's conclusion was
correct.
2, After frustration of an original expectation of privacy occurs,
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of
the now-nonprivate information.
In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,119,104 S.Ct. 1652,1660 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court held that the 'Viewing of what a private party had
freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment."
In Jacobsen, Federal Express employees at an airport discovered a package that
had been damaged during shipping. 466 U.S. at 111, 104 S. Ct. at 1655. In
accordance with the company's policy regarding insurance claims, the employees
opened the package to examine its contents and found inside a ten-inch tube
containing four plastic baggies of white powder. Id. The employees notified the
In converse fashion, defendant apparently challenges a ruling the trial court
never made. As he did below, defendant argues that his parents did not have
common authority of the truck to consent to the deputy's search. R50-45; Aplt. Br. at
12-14. The trial court, however, made no findings or conclusions on this theory, nor
did it rely on amy mode of consent in concluding that the deputy's entry into the
truck was legally justified. R86-83. Accordingly, the State does not address this
argument.

14

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the package contents
roughly as they found them. Id. When the DEA agent arrived, he took the tube out
of the box, removed the plastic baggies from the tube, and identified the white
powder as cocaine by field testing a sample from each baggie. Id. at 111-12,104 S.
Ct. at 1655. After agents performed a second field test, they rewrapped the package,
secured a search warrant for the place to which the package was addressed,
executed the warrant, and arrested the defendants. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal agents' removal of the baggies
from the package and testing of the cocaine "did not infringe any constitutionally
protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of
private conduct/7 Id. at 126,104 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court first observed that the
Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official/"
Id. at 113-14, 104 S. Ct. at 1656 (citation omitted). The Court then held that the
private individual may reveal that information to police without implicating the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 117,104 S. Ct. at 1658. The Court explained that "[o]nce
frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate information." Id. The
15

Court further explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the
authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not
already been frustrated/' Id. at 117,104 S. Ct. at 1658-59.
Relying on Jacobsen, this Court upheld an official search of a briefcase after
law enforcement was informed by private individuals that they had discovered
child pornography in the briefcase. State v. Miller, 2004 UT App 445, f % 2-3104 P.3d
1272. In Miller, employees of a company from which Miller leased a truck came
across what they believed was child pornography in the cab of Miller's truck. Id. at
\ 2. They found the illicit materials inside Miller's briefcase, which was fitted with
combination locks and wrapped aroimd with tape. Id. A police officer, responding
to the company's call, was given the briefcase and told that it contained child
pornography. Id. at | 3. He opened the briefcase and reviewed some of the
photographs. Id.
Miller was charged with ten counts of child pornography. Id at Tf 4. He
moved to suppress the photographs found in the briefcase, as well as others found
in a search incident to arrest, arguing that the officer's search of the briefcase
exceeded the scope of the employees' search. Id. at f f 4,11. The trial court denied
Miller's motion to suppress, and he was convicted at trial on all counts. Id. at 4.

16

On appeal, this Court held that the leasing company's employees were
"private actors, and by opening the briefcase and viewing the materials inside,
[defendant's expectation of privacy in the viewed materials was extinguished. Id. at
t 10 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115, 120, 104 S. Ct. 1652).

Consequently,

governmental use of the information was not prohibited. Id. The Court also held
that because the police officer viewed fewer photographs than viewed by the leasing
company's employees, the official search did not exceed the scope of the private
search. Id. at f 15. See id. at 1 9 ("'[T]he Government may not exceed the scope of
the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search/7') (quoting
Jacobsen, 466 U.S at 116,104 S. Ct. 1652).
Here, the trial court concluded that the drug-tainted paraphernalia and the
digital scales "discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does [sic] not
fall within the scope of the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure
contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article

17

One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution/7 R84.5 In support of this
conclusion, the court found the following facts: (1) the Rowleys were private actors
who at no time acted as agents of law enforcement (R84); (2) while inside
defendant's truck, Mr. Rowley found the drug-tainted paraphernalia in an open
cubby hole in the truck's dashboard (R85); (3) Mrs. Rowley found a digital scale in
one of defendant's bags in the rear bed of the truck (id.) (4) after speaking with
Deputy Provstgaard, the Rowleys, on the deputy's directions, put the items back
where he had found them (id.)} (4) when the Deputy Provstgaard arrived, Mr.
Rowley accompanied him to the garage, from where the deputy could see the drugtainted paraphernalia in plain view (id. at 85-84); (5) Deputy Provstgaard opened the
door of the truck and seized the drug-tainted paraphernalia; he also seized the
digital scale from the rear bed of the truck (id.). Defendant does not dispute any of

5

By failing to address the trial court's private- actor rationale for denying his
suppression motion, defendant has waived any claim that the an analysis under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution should differ from a Fourth
Amendment analysis. See State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 21 n.2, 57 P.3d 1052 ("The
parties have not argued for a separate analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, and therefore, we address the issue only under the federal
constitution."); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah App. 1994) (stating that "an
appellate court can decline to address state constitutional claims under article I,
section 14 if the party 'fails to proffer any explanation as to how this court's analysis
should differ' under this section from the federal counterpart.") (citation omitted).
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the trial court's findings, nor that the discovery of the illegal items constituted
probable cause that he had committed the crimes charged. Aplt. Br. at 9.
The court's conclusion that the search and seizure of the illegal items were not
subject to the protections of the federal and state constitutions is especially wellfounded under Jacobsen and Miller: the official search and seizure of illegal items,
found by law enforcement was justified because it not only stemmed from and was
within the scope of discovery of the items by private persons, but the search
involved entry into space with a decreased expectation of privacy. Compare Jacobsen,
466 U.S. at 111, 104 S. Ct. at 1655 ("Letters and other sealed packages are in the
general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of
privacy/') with California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,391,105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985) (holding
persons have a "decreased expectation of privacy" in an automobile).
Here, the Deputy Provstgaard entered into space with a deceased expectation
of privacy when he opened the door of defendant's truck, which he knew from
private parties—defendant's parents— contained illict materials, and seized them.
Further, unlike law enforcement in Jacobsen and Miller, Deputy Provstgaard also saw
the illicit materials in plain view before he even entered the truck. In short, without
necessary recourse to any other rationale, the trial court correctly denied
defendant's motion to suppress under the private-actor theory set out above. In any
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event, the court correctly ruled that the official search of defendant's truck was
justified under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
C. Neither the federal nor state constitutions require a separate
exigency to justify the search of an automobile.
Defendant argues that the court incorrectly concluded that the search was
justified under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement of both the
federal and state constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 14-17. Defendant concedes that the
contraband found inside his truck was clearly incriminating and in plain view—
thus establishing probable cause—but argues that the deputy's entry into the truck
was not justified by exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 9-11, 14-17. Under the
circumstances of this case, that argument is groundless under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States constitution and untenable under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
1. The Fourth Amendment does not require a separate exigency
for the automobile exception.
Defendant argues that Deputy Provstgaard improperly searched his truck
because, although there was probable cause of criminal activity, there were no
exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 14-17. In all but name, he advances this
argument as an instance in which the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement fails to justify a warrantless search for lack of
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exigent circumstances. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1996)
("[I]n 1991, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirements of
probable cause and exigent circumstances as a precondition to a valid warrantless
search of an automobile/') (citing California v. Acevdo, 500 U.S.565, 569, 111 S.
Ct.1982,1985-86) (1991)).6 This argument is meritless under current law.
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, law
enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. See U.S.
Const, amend. IV. "However, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
provides that '"[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle
without more/ , , , , State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, If 13,173 P.3d 213 (quoting
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,467,119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999) (per curiam)) (omission in
original) (additional citation omitted). Commenting on the present scope of the

If this Court determines that defendant did not advance his argument under
the automobile exception, the Court may nevertheless consider that theory as an
alternative ground to affirm the trial court's ruling. "[A]n appellate court may
affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated
by the trial court to be the basis for its ruling or action/" State v. Johnson, 2008 UT
App 5, f 21,178 P.3d 915 (citation omitted). As set out above, the record readily
supports application of the automobile exception under the Fourth amendment.
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automobile exception, the Despain court recognized that the United States Supreme
Court had rejected the rule defendant in this case urges on appeal:
Utah courts [had] concluded that a warrantless search of a vehicle was
not proper unless there was both probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contained contraband and exigent circumstances indicating a
likelihood that the evidence may be destroyed or lost if not
immediately seized
More recently, however, federal law has been
clarified. The United States Supreme Court has now unequivocally
stated that "under [its] established precedent, the 'automobile
exception' has no separate exigency requirement/' Dyson, 527 U.S. at
466,119 S.Ct. 2013.
Id. at % 14 (brackets added in citation) (citations omitted).
The Despain court also recognized that"' [e]ven in cases where an automobile
[is] not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use
as a readily mobile vehicle justifiefs] application of the vehicular exception.'" Id. at
115 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,391,105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985)). Indeed,
the exception applies "even after it has been impounded and is in police custody."
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259,261 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970)). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S .Ct. 2523 (1973)
(allowing a warrantless search when the mobility of the automobile was clearly not
present because the automobile had been towed to a garage following an accident);
United States v. Paredes, 388 F.Supp.2d 1185,1195-96 (D. Hawaii 2005) ("even after
[defendant's] car had been towed to a private garage, the automobile exception still
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permitted law enforcement personnel to conduct a warrantless search-provided that
the officers had probable cause to conduct the search"). In short, the warrantless
search of an automobile, supported by probable cause of criminal activity, is
allowed because a warrant would not provide significant protection of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment interests. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,831,102 S. Ct.
2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Here, defendant concedes that Deputy Provstgaard had probable cause of
defendant's criminal activity, based on the deputy's plain view of the incriminating
items inside defendant's truck from the deputy's rightful position within the
Rowleys' garage. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Noihing more was required under the Fourth
Amendment automobile exception to justify the search of defendant's truck and the
seizure of the illegal items.
2. Defendant's claim under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution fails as a threshold matter because defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cab of his truck was
extinguished after his parents entered it and revealed its
incriminating contents to law enforcement
Defendant also argues that, given the absence of exigent circumstances, the
search of his truck violated his rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah
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Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 14-15 In support, he cites Anderson and State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). In Larocco , a plurality of the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that probable cause and exigent circumstances were required to justify a
warrantless search of an automobile under article I, section 14. Id. at 470. A
different plurality agreed with the result in Anderson, but for a different reason. 910
P.2d at 1237. Neither case supports defendant's claim.
In Larocco, the defendant took a car from an auto sales lot and did not return
it. 794 P.2d at 461. Two years later, the police found what appeared to be the stolen
car in front of Larocco's home. Id. Further investigation that day showed that the
car was registered to Larocco. Id. A week later, police returned to Larocco's home
and found the car still parked. Id. They examined the vehicle identification number
("VIN") on the dashboard through the windshield and found that, although it
matched the VIN on Larocco's official registration records, it did not match that of
Defendant also cursorily argues in conclusion that "[I]f a search or seizure
violates the . . . Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, any evidence obtained as a
result of such illegality must be excluded." Aplt. Br. at 17. In support, he cites State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,786 (Utah 1991). The Court should decline to consider the
claim because it is inadequately briefed. ." See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304
(Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed.) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief "wholly lacked
legal analysis and authority to support his argument")). In an event, as discussed
below, the exclusionary rule should not be applied.
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the stolen car. Id. The officers then, without a warrant, opened the unlocked door
and examined the VTN on the safety sticker on the inside edge of the door. Id. This
VIN differed from that on the dashboard, but matched that of the stolen car. Id. The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Larocco's suppression motion,
holding that, because Larocco had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN
under federal law, no search within the meaning of the Fourth amendment had
taken place. Id. at 464.
A plurality of the Utah Supreme Court reversed this holding. Id. at 471. The
plurality wrote that, because federal search and seizure cases were so inconsistent in
applying the Fourth amendment in automobile searches, it was constrained to
resolve the case under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to simplify
search and seizure rules. Id. at 465-69 (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.).8
Accordingly, the plurality announced that it would "continue to use the concept of
an expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for determining whether
article I, section 14 is applicable." Id. at 469. "Then if article I section 14 applies,
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional
justification, namely to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the
8

Justice Stewart concurred in the result. Id. at 473. Justice Howe joined
Justice Hall, who dissented. Id. at 473-74.
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destruction of evidence/' Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted). The plurality then noted
that historically it had required both probable cause and exigent circumstances in
warrantless vehicle searches under article I, section 14. Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
The plurality concluded that because there was no indication that Larocco had been
alerted to police presence, there was no exigency. Id. at 470-71. The plurality thus
held that the opening of the car door to inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable
search under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 470-71.
As noted, the Larocco decision did not command a majority. Therefore, it is
not controlling. But even if controlling, Larocco does not support defendant's claim
because defendant cannot meet Larocco's threshold requirement: he had no
expectation of privacy because it was extinguished when his parents intruded into
his otherwise constitutionally protected space. Aple. Br. at IB2; Miller, 2004 UT App
445, Tf 10. Thus, under Larocco, the Court does not proceed to the next question, i.e.,
whether the search was precluded by the absence of a separate exigency.
In Anderson, a different plurality reaffirmed the Larocco plurality's view that
the automobile exception requires a separate exigency under article I, section 14.
910 P.2d at 1237 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J.).9 It did so, however, from a
9

Justice's Stewart and Zimmerman separately concurred in the result. Id. at
1239-41. Justice Durham concurred and dissented. Id. at 1241-42.
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different perspective.

The Anderson plurality recognized that the court had

" endeavored toward uniformity in the application of the search and seizure
requirements of the state and federal constitutions/7 id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
After reviewing relevant Fourth Amendment law, the plurality concluded that the
warrantless search of an automobile must be "premised on probable cause and
exigent circumstances/' Id. at 1236-37 (citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569, 111 S. Ct. at
1985-86). Thus, the Anderson plurality wrote, "\b]ecause this portion of Larocco
coincides with federal law, we agree with those who joined the Larocco plurality that
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires that warrantless searches of
automobiles be justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances/'
Id. at 1237 (emphasis added).
The joining of the Larocco and Anderson pluralities constitutes a doubtful
concensus, given the Anderson plurality's rationale for joining the Larocco plurality
and the subsequent clarification of the law since Anderson. The Anderson plurality
joined the Larocco plurality because it was predisposed to follow federal
constitutional law and because developments in that law agreed with the Larocco
plurality's insistence on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless vehicle
search. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. Since Anderson issued, however, the United
States Supreme Court has clarified that a search under "'the automobile exception
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has no separate exigency requirement/" Despain, 2007 UT App 367, If 14 (quoting
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013). Thus, to the extent that the Anderson
plurality agreed with the Larocco plurality's view based on the status of federal
constitutional law, that agreement is now suspect. Consequently, the rule that the
Utah automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstance is also
suspect. In short, there exists no substantial basis that the deputy's search in this
case was precluded under article I, section 14: not only did defendant lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cab of his truck, but also the Utah
Constitution does not clearly require the existence of a separate exigency before law
enforcement conducts a warrantless search of an automobile.
This Court should not, in any event, interpret section 14 differently than it
does the Fourth Amendment. "It is a cardinal rule of construction that
constitutions should be construed in light of their framers' intent." American Fork v.
Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). In discerning that intent, the Utah
Supreme Court has considered a variety of sources. "[T]he starting point," of
course, "should always be the plain meaning of the textual language." American
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, % 115, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durham, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^f
37, 162 P.3d 1106. Where the plain language of the provision is inadequate to
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discern the framers' intent, the Court has looked to the common law, the historical
source of the provision, similar provisions in the federal and sister state
constitutions, the official report of Utah's constitutional convention, statutory law in
effect at the time of the convention, relevant historical state traditions, and other
related state constitutional provisions. See Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1072; West v.
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,1015 (Utah 1994); State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889,
891-92 (Utah 1996); PIE. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144,1148
(Utah 1988). In a few cases, the Court has also indicated a willingness to consider
"policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials." Soc'y of
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,921 n.6 (Utah 1993); Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, at Tf 37.
The Court in Whitehead explained that "[e]ach of these types of evidence can
help in divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any
constitutional interpretation." Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (emphasis added). In
other words, despite its expressed willingness to look at non-textual or nonhistorical evidence, Whitehead, like its progenitors, viewed "divining the intent and
purpose of the framers" as the ultimate purpose for looking at those sources. But see
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, at Tf 37 (holding that courts may "rely on whatever
assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process," but not
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limiting that review to divining the intent of the framers). As explained by Justice
Durrant in American Bush, such an approach "is the most appropriate interpretive
course to follow when confronted with constitutional questions/' American Bush,
2006 UT 40, at f 86 (Durrant, J., concurring). It "provides stability to state
government while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this state
who should ultimately determine how our society should be structured[jsG2]." Id. at
\ 84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 774-80
(1993) (endorsing an "historically-based" approach that incorporates neutral
principles).
In dicta, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that Section 14 "often provides
greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical language."
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, If 16,164 P.3d 397. In reality, however, the Court has
found greater protections only on rare occasions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810
P.2d 415,418 (Utah 1991) (holding that section 14 recognizes a privacy interest in
bank records); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that police were required to obtain warrant before opening door of
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stolen car to inspect the VIN).

This case should not be added to that select list.

Indeed, an examination of the historical genesis of section 14 evidences the framers7
intent to provide protections that are identical to those afforded under the Fourth
Amendment.
Many cite to the antipolygamy raids as support for the proposition that the
framers intended to provide greater protections under section 14. But those events
do not support that proposition. The complaint of Utah's settlers was not that the
Fourth Amendment was inadequate, but that it was disregarded. See generally
Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids, 64
Utah Hist. Qtly 316-34gsG3] (1994). Thus, when adopting the Utah Constitution, the
framers included a declaration of rights patterned after the federal Bill of Rights. See
Utah Const, art. I. Although the framers looked to the 44 other state constitutions in
drafting a declaration of rights, "[t]he inspiration behind the declaration of rights
came from the great parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country." 1
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 102 (Star Printing
Co. 1898); 2 Official Report 1847.

10

In State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546, the Court analyzed an
administrative traffic checkpoint under the Utah Constitution, but adopted the
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court.
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Where the framers found the federal rights lacking in clarity or substance,
they modified them. See, e.g. Utah Const art. I, § 4 (detailing principles of
separation of church and state), § 9 (adding unnecessary rigor clause), § 6 (clarifying
that right to bear arms is for security and defense, but may be regulated), § 10
(identifying number of jurors and proportion required for a verdict), § 12 (adding
right to appeal and spousal privilege), § 15 (detailing free speech right), § 22 (adding
that private property may not be damaged without just compensation). Others
rights they left relatively untouched. See, e.g. Utah Const, art. I, § 5 (tracking
language in U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 2), § 7 (tracking Fourteenth Amendment), § 14
(tracking Fourth Amendment). As to those, it reasonably can be assumed that the
framers intended they be accorded the same meaning as their federal counterpart.
See Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the
Antipoligamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev, 1,2-10 (1995). Indeed, the language of Section
5 was expressly modified to track the language of article I, section 9 of the United
States Constitution, so that it would not be considered "in a different way/' 1
Official Proceedings 257. Because Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth
Amendment, this Court should presume that Section 14 mirrors the Fourth
Amendment unless there is evidence to suggest it provides greater protections
(interstitial approach utilizing a mirroring presumption).
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Although the interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation
supports the conclusion that Section 14 rights are coterminous with Fourth
Amendment rights, the same cannot be said with respect to the remedy for a
violation of those rights. The Larocco plurality concluded that "exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section
14." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 460. But several factors dictate against that conclusion.
First, the language of Section 14 does not call for exclusion of evidence. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 14; Cassell, The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 807-12. Second,
most states at the time did not impose an exclusionary rule. Cassell, The Utah
Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 800-05. Third, the common law did not embody an
exclusionary rule. See id. at 806-07. Fourth, the first Utah legislature did not require
exclusion of evidence for unreasonable searches and seizures, but imposed criminal
sanctions instead. See id. at 809-12. And fifth, the prevailing traditions of the time
do not support exclusion. See id. at 812-14, 819-22. While this Court may not
overrule the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of a state exclusionary rule, the
historical context of Section 14 does not provide a basis for the Court to extend the
exclusionary rule, as requested by Defendant.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted July 29,2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

-vs-

AND ORDER
Case No. 061402245

BRANDON ROWLEY
Defendant.

JUDGE: STEVEN L. HANSEN

COMES NOW THE COURT, having been fully informed as to the relevant facts in this
matter and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. After being arrested on May 24, 2006, Defendant, Brandon Rowley left his Chevrolet
S-10 Pickup truck parked in front of his parents residence in Saratoga Springs, UT.
2. Defendant's truck was registered in his name only and he had owned the truck for 5-6
months prior to his arrest.
3. Before being taken to jail, Defendant asked his father, Mr. Dudley Rowley to take care
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of the things that were in the back of his truck.
4. Defendant did not ask his parents to move the truck, but after defendant was taken to
jail, Mr. Dudley Rowley obtained the keys from defendant's bedroom and moved the truck inside
his garage at his residence to protect it from the weather.
5. While moving the truck, Mr. Dudley Rowley discovered a syringe and a small
porcelain cup that had a crystalline substance in it, inside the pickup truck in an open cubby hole
in the truck's dash.
6. Thereafter, Mrs. Rowley, the defendant's mother found a digital scale in a bag located
in the back bed of the pickup truck.
7. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley informed the defendant of what they had found during a
telephone conversation with him. After this telephone conversation, Mr. Rowley called Deputy
Sheriff Story Provstgaard and reported finding the items. Deputy Provstgaard requested the
Dudley's to put the items back where they had been found and then stated he would come to pick
them up.
8. Deputy Provstgaard went to the Rowley residence in Saratoga Springs and was
accompanied to the garage area by Mr. Rowley, where defendant's truck was parked.
9. Mr. Rowley showed Deputy Provstgaard the location of the syringe and the porcelain
cup with the crystalline substance. Deputy Provstgaard could see these items from outside the
truck.
10. Deputy Provstgaard opened the truck door, entered the truck and took custody of the
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syringe and porcelain cup with crystalline substancefromthe inside of the truck cab and the
digital scalesfromthe back bed of the truck.
11. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley acted independently as private citizens and were at no time
acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriffs office or any other law enforcement agency.
12. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley gave voluntary consent for Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard to enter
their garage, where defendant's truck was parked.
13. The syringe and small porcelain cup with the crystalline substance were located in
the plain view of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard from a place he was entitled to be.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The syringe, the small porcelain cup with crystalline substance and the digital scales
discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does not fall within the scope of the
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution.
2. The presence of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard in Mr. and Mrs. Rowley's garage was
occasioned by voluntary consent and thus is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution.
3. The "plain view" discovery of the syringe and small procelain cup with crystalline
substance that was taken into custody by Deputy Provstgaard falls under the recognized
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution
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4. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant's rights against unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One,
Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution,

ORDER
4otic to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
The defendant's Motion

Dated this

, 2007.

STEVEN
FOURTH DISTRIC|

Approved

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document to
Gunda Jarvis, Utah County Public Defender Association, 51 South University Ave., Suite 206,
Provo, Utah 84601, on April 3,2007.
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